INTRODUCTION
The contemporary European Union needs a stronger sense of identity to overcome its existing crises and divisions. Implementation of common European standards requires that the competing interests of Member States be reconciled in order to find a point of balance between the autonomy of legal systems and the idea of the internal market. EU law is constantly changing, which is reflected in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union constituting the acquis communautaire. In analysing judgments in the area of the EU citizenship and company law, one might discern a clear tendency of the Court of Justice to accentuate an EU identity, which is a source of rights for citizens or companies, independent of particular Member States' legal orders. EU identity manifests itself most strongly in the institution of EU citizenship, but in recent times the Court of Justice has emphasized the importance of identity also in connection with the operation of companies falling under Article 54 (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 1 , which will be the subject of further consideration.
I. EU CITIZENSHIP AS A INDEPENDENT BASIS OF RIGHTS OF NATURAL PERSONS
European Union citizenship is a legal bond connecting a natural person with the Union, granting a given person certain rights and imposing obligations (theoretically) on him/her 2 . The introduction of EU citizenship by the Maastricht Treaty resulted in the expansion of the subjective and [Vol 3:1 objective scopes of natural persons' entitlements 3 . All Union citizens, regardless of whether they conduct economic activity, were given the opportunity to invoke the provisions of law stipulated in the Treaty. It should be noted that EU citizenship has strengthened the link between the Union and its citizens 4 . Initially, EU citizenship was perceived symbolically, 5 and its introduction was not linked with significant changes in the set of entitlements conferred under EU law upon the citizens of Member States 6 , except for the right to participate in municipal elections as well as elections to the European Parliament as well as diplomatic and consular protection 7 . In recent years, the Court of Justice has questioned this view of EU citizenship, and through its rulings it has imparted real significance to the entitlements resulting from TFEU 8 . The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice on EU citizenship has also been affected by amendments introduced into the Treaties.
Under the current wording of the relevant regulations, EU citizenship is mentioned in both Article 9 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 9 and in Article 20 of the TFEU. The TEU contains provisions of a general nature while the section from the TFEU regarding citizenship constitutes a complimentary set of regulations 10 12 . Recent decisions of the Court of Justice confirm that EU citizenship bestows upon citizens a guarantee of exercise of their rights as granted under the Treaty independently of those derived from the internal law of individual Member States -EU citizenship is becoming an independent structure, thereby strengthening the position of the individual with regard to the internal laws of the Member States 13 . The new approach of the Court of Justice regarding the rights to which every citizen of the Union is entitled was clearly expressed in the Rottmann case 14 , in which the Court considered whether the loss of national citizenship (which, according to international law, falls within the competence of the Member States) might be adjudicated with respect to EU law if that loss results in the additional loss of EU citizenship. Janko Rottman, an Austrian citizen, settled in Germany and applied for German citizenship. Once his application was granted, he was denaturalized in Austria. However, the decision on naturalization in Germany was then reversed due to his withholding information of proceedings pending against him. Had this decision come into force, denaturalization would have given him the status of a stateless person, thereby causing the loss of EU citizen status 15 .
In his opinion to the Rottmann case, Advocate General Maduro advanced a very restrictive interpretation of the scope of EU citizenship, holding that a cross-border element was necessary in that case 16 . Advocate General Maduro identified such a foreign element, and declared the case to be admissible for a preliminary ruling 17 . Having analysed the presented preliminary questions, the Court stated, in contrast to the approach taken by Advocate General Maduro in his Opinion, that it is not necessary to demonstrate the existence of a cross border element since:
'It is clear that the situation of a citizen of the Union who, like the applicant in the main proceedings, is faced with a decision withdrawing his naturalisation, adopted by the authorities of one 11 In other words, Member States are obliged to take EU law into account when exercising their powers in the sphere of nationality 19 . In its judgment the Court of Justice confirmed that a decision on revoking nationalization should be taken in the context of rights resulting from EU citizenship, respecting the principle of proportionality 20 . Thus, EU citizenship can no longer be perceived only as an institution supplementing national citizenship, but as an independent basis for the creation of specific entitlements for individuals 21 . After the Rottmann judgment, there can be no doubt that Member States do not wield absolute power over the granting and revocation of citizenship, but they must instead do so with regard for the acquis communautaire 22 . In that regard, the Rottmann case might be perceived as a revolution in the approach to the scope of rights resulting from EU citizenship, and it is a significant development in the context of understanding the notion of EU identity 23 .
II. COMPANIES' EXISTENCE WITHIN THE INTERNAL MARKET
In the case of natural persons, acquiring EU citizenship constitutes a preliminary condition to enjoying the freedom of establishment, whereas with respect to companies 'EU membership' plays a similar role. This 'membership' does not constitute an inherent trait of each company operating on the internal market. 28 A principal place of business could be described as the location where the material resources and personnel of the company are concentrated, see inter alia Mustaki and Engammare (n 26) 11. 29 See Cases C-378/10 VALE (n 25) para 27; C-210/06 Cartesio (n 25) para 104; 81/87 Daily Mail and General Trust (n 25) para 19. 30 
particular importance in light of the Court of Justice jurisprudence regarding the EU citizenship to which natural persons are entitled. In the Rottmann case, the Court of Justice determined that the matter of loss of citizenship falling within the competence of the Member States cannot be examined separately from the entitlements arising from EU citizenship. In the case of companies, to which article 54 (1) TEU applies, it is time for the Court of Justice to confirm that the question of their functioning is not within the sole competence of Member States 32 . While keeping in mind the passage that gives companies the right to enjoy the freedom of establishment ('companies (…) shall (…) be treated in the same way as natural persons who are nationals of Member States'), the consequences resulting from the proposed interpretation of article 54 (1) TFEU should be considered. Incorporation of an 'EU entity' depends on (as it results from the wording of the referred provision) incorporation of a 'national entity', whereas its further functioning (including dissolution) requires acquis communautaire to be taken into account, which means that in a particular situation the provisions of national law may not apply.
Problems regarding companies' mobility processes (including crossborder restructuring) have not been solved within the internal market 33 . A consequence of the dynamic development of European company law is a quest for instruments and legal solutions that would help ensure optimisation of conducting cross-border economic activity 34 . Companies enjoying the right to free movement under the freedom of establishment have long encountered obstacles to emigration and immigration 35 . Based on previous judgments, one may conclude that Member States are obliged to refrain from any action that could make it difficult for companies to enjoy the rights granted by the Court of Justice, e.g. they cannot freely (without reasonable justification and within limits determined by the Court of Justice) impede the processes under discussion; however, practice shows that companies' rights are not adequately protected. 32 
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Referring to the decision of the Court recently issued in the VALE case on 12 July 2012 concerning the right to cross-border conversion, many difficulties would have been avoided, and the rights resulting from the freedom of establishment would not have been violated, if the VALE company could have completed the process of cross-border conversion based on the 'EU entity' concept 36 . In this case, a limited liability company governed by Italian law, VALE Costruzioni, asked to be removed from the commercial register, while at the same time intending to transfer its seat and economic activity to Hungary 37 . As a result of its application, the company was stricken from the commercial register in Italy. It was noted in the Italian register that the company had transferred its seat to Hungary. A few months later, the articles of association of VALE Építési were adopted, and a limited liability company in a formation governed by Hungarian law was subsequently created 38 . VALE Építési applied for registration in the commercial register in Hungary while designating VALE Costruzioni as its predecessor in law 39 (that is, the company established and removed from the commercial register in Italy). The application was rejected first by the Commercial Court and then by the Appeals Court. Finally, the matter was referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.
The company VALE had intended to complete a cross-border conversion process based on the Treaty rules on freedom of establishment 40 . 36 Cross-border reorganization processes have already been analysed by the Court of Justice, however, the VALE case is the first case in which the Court considered the situation of cross-border conversion of a capital company. As far as previous decisions regarding the cross-border mobility of companies are concerned, the theses expressed in cases Überseering, SEVIC and Cartesio are of particular importance to the issues discussed. In its Überseering judgment the Court acknowledged that it was incompatible with the Treaty provisions on freedom of establishment for the host Member State to deny legal capacity to a company established in another Member State which had transferred its real seat to the first Member State whilst maintaining its status as a company incorporated under the legislation of the home Member State (C-208/00 Überseering (n 35) para 95). In the SEVIC case, the Court stressed that domestic regulation which introduces a general ban on entering cross-border mergers into a register while allowing such entries provided that both companies have their registered office in this Member State is inconsistent with the provisions on freedom of establishment (C-411/03 SEVIC Systems (n 35) para 31). Ruling in the next case, the Court of Justice acknowledged that cross-border transfer of a company's real seat with retention of its status as a company incorporated under the legislation of the home Member State does not enter into the scope of protection of freedom of establishment (C-210/06 Cartesio (n 25) para 110). Nevertheless, in the next points of its judgment, the Court affirmed the companies' right to cross-border conversion. In the aforementioned situation, a company moves its seat abroad, changing its statute and adapting to the requirements in force in the host Member State. The winding-up or liquidation of the company is not then possible in the home Member State, to the extent that the law of the host Member State allows such conversion (C-210/06 Cartesio (n 25) para 110). 37 Case C-378/10 VALE (n 25) para 9. Company VALE intended to transfer both its registered office and central administration from Italy to Hungary. 38 Case C-378/10 VALE (n 25) para 10. 39 Case C-378/10 VALE (n 25) para 11. 40 Pursuant to Italian law (State of departure), VALE Costruzioni no longer existed because of its removal from the commercial register -it was no longer a national entity. Moreover, VALE Építési did not yet exist as a legal person under Hungarian law (State of destination) since registration of the company in Hungary was refused 41 . It could be qualified as a company in formation, and in consequence it had the legal capacity to initiate proceedings before both national and European courts 42 . The company's non-existence under Italian law was one of the main grounds for refusal of its registration. Nevertheless, the Hungarian authorities did not take into consideration the documents issued by Italian authorities in order to determine if the company complied with the conditions laid down in the Member State of origin. The Court of Justice noted that, pursuant to the principle of effectiveness, during the registration procedure the authorities of the Member State of destination are required to take due account of documents obtained from the authorities of the Member State of departure 43 . In that regard the competent authorities shall examine if the said company maintains its status as an existing subject of law, which enables it to complete the cross-border conversion. It should be emphasized that the extract from the Italian commercial register confirmed that 'the company (had) moved to Hungary' 44 . In these circumstances, there is no doubt that the converting company, VALE, complied with the two conditions provided for in Article 54 (1) TFEU and, consequently, could be recognized as an 'EU entity'. In its judgement the Court stated:
'that question relates to the examination, to be made by the Hungarian authorities, of the issue whether VALE Costruzioni disassociated itself from Italian law, in accordance with the conditions laid down thereunder, while retaining its legal personality, thereby enabling it to convert into a company governed by Hungarian law.' 45 (emphasis added). In this statement the Court acknowledged -indirectly -the existence and the importance of an 'EU entity' which can operate irrespective of national legal orders 46 . PERSPECTIVES FOR CITIZENS AND COMPANIES 56
III. CONSEQUENCES OF RECOGNITION OF THE EU ENTITY
In the VALE case, the Court of Justice ruled that a regulation that allows in a general manner (as in the case of the Hungarian provisions) for different treatment of domestic and foreign companies in relation to the transformation process is inconsistent with EU law 47 . A similar view was expressed earlier in the SEVIC case with regard to mergers of companies 48 . Moreover, for the purposes of cross-border conversion processes, the Court of Justice noted that the authorities of a Member State of destination are obliged to record in the commercial register the company of the Member State of origin as the 'predecessor in law' to the converted company, if such a record is possible in relation to domestic conversions 49 . However, the legislation of a Member State of destination may impose "strict legal and economic continuity between the predecessor company which applied to be converted and the converted successor company', provided that such a requirement is held in relation to domestic companies 50 . The concept of an 'EU entity' fits perfectly into the context of maintaining the legal subjectivity of a converted company. This concept makes it possible to overcome the differences among the legal systems of particular Member States through acceptance of a legal fiction. This legal fiction is based on the assumption that there is an entity at the EU level that, having cited the Treaty provisions on freedom of establishment, may effect a cross-border transformation regardless of restrictions enacted in national legislation. Thus, once having fulfilled the requirements necessary for crossborder conversion, the regulations of the State of departure require the company's obligatory dissolution, it will be able to enjoy the status of 'EU entity' in the State of destination on condition that such a company fulfils the two conditions set out in Article 54 (1) TFEU. The first condition will be fulfilled as a matter of course because the company, in connection with the first incorporation, is already subject to the protection of freedom of establishment; deletion of the company from the register in the State of origin for the purposes of cross-border conversion, according to the proposed interpretation, can not thwart this effect. Therefore, the second condition, associated with having a seat in the territory of one of the Member States, will be decisive. When assessing the second condition, consideration might be made of the location of the central administration, which is the place where decision-makers are seated, or the principal place of business, i.e. the location where material resources and personnel (of the company) are concentrated. In order to ensure the protection of creditors and certainty of legal transactions, the register of the State of departure should include a clear reference to which Member State the company is transferred; hence the process of conversion could be completed only in this Member State. This would serve as a basis to distinguish between definitive dissolution and liquidation of the company and the transfer of its business to another Member State. When these conditions are fulfilled, the cross-border conversion will not be blocked due to the fact the company ceased to exist 51 . Recognition of the "EU entity' should strengthen the competitiveness of companies incorporated within the internal market in relation to companies operating outside from it (e.g. in the USA). Companies' supranational identity should affect cross-border reorganization processes through minimizing the occurrence of refusal of registration. At the same time, the authorities in the Member State of departure will be obliged to ensure that reliable and transparent information is easily available to creditors and minority shareholders. As far as this issue is concerned, a significant role should also be assigned in the future to the EU Companies 52 . This is a new challenge for EU institutions and Member States. As the European Parliament emphasized in its resolution of 7 September 2010 on the interconnection of business registers, the further integration of the European Economic Area can only be exploited if all Member States take part in the network 53 . Cooperation between registers of all Member States will enable the processing of data concerning companies' legal and financial situation within the internal market. Each company will obtain a unique number in order to be easily identified within the European Economic Area 54 . Member States should ensure the reliability of documents and data. The coordination of the different legal systems will strengthen economic cooperation in the European sphere.
CONCLUSIONS
A distinct separation of rights arising from European and national status may contribute to the strengthening of economic integration in the internal market. As in the case of EU citizenship, 'EU entity' status constitutes an independent category. Establishing the scope of rights arising from this status should take place gradually, as expressed in the decisions of the Court of Justice.
The development of European company law should be oriented towards the creation of favourable conditions for companies going through cross-border restructuring on the one hand, whereas on the other it should ensure protection of the interests of various entities, particularly creditors. The concept of 'EU entity' is suited to both of these purposes, therefore it is worth being developed by the Court of Justice in future judicial decisions.
National entities established on various grounds and having diverse internal structures should have an opportunity to appeal to their supranational identity when enjoying the freedom of establishment. Whether this status could become an autonomous one in the future, independent of particular domestic legal orders, remains an entirely different issue.
